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Uncertainty is a ubiquitous component of human economic behaviour, yet
people can vary in their preferences for risk across populations, individuals
and different points in time. As uncertainty also characterizes many aspects
of animal decision-making, comparative research can help evaluate different
potential mechanisms that generate this variation, including the role of bio-
logical differences or maturational change versus cultural learning, as well as
identify human-unique components of economic decision-making. Here, we
examine decision-making under risk across non-human primates, our closest
relatives. We first review theoretical approaches and current methods for
understanding decision-making in animals. We then assess the current evi-
dence for variation in animal preferences between species and populations,
between individuals based on personality, sex and age, and finally, between
different contexts and individual states. We then use these primate data to
evaluate the processes that can shape human decision-making strategies
and identify the primate foundations of human economic behaviour.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of
economic behaviours among non-human primates’.1. Introduction
Decisions about uncertainty are central to many aspects of human economic be-
haviour, from choices between assets with different levels of risk in financial
markets, to choices about the investment of energy and time in foraging versus
hunting activities in subsistence societies. Yet humans also show great variation
in their responses to risk across groups, individuals and contexts. For example,
there are differences in typical risk propensities across different nations [1,2]
and small-scale societies [3–5]. Within populations, there can be stable inter-
individual differences that vary by gender [6,7], personality [8,9] or stage in
the life-course [9–13]. Finally, individuals can also flexibly shift strategies
across time, showing different preferences for risk in different contexts [14,15]
or depending on their own internal states [16–19]. Understanding the causal
mechanisms generating this variation, as well the downstream consequen-
ces of different decision strategies, is, therefore, a crucial issue in economics,
psychology and biology.
How and why do individuals make different kinds of choices? Studies of
human decision-making first indicate that some variation in strategies can
stem from an individual’s (or population’s) particular cultural or environmental
experiences—and may even constitute adaptive, learned responses to local
environments [5,12,20]. For example, various proposals highlight how market
experiences [5], familiarity with particular cultural norms [1,21] or socialization
practices [6,21] may drive differences in decision-making across groups or indi-
viduals. Alternatively, other processes that are not experience-dependent may




2individuals [22–24], the hormonal status of men versus
women [18,19] or the maturation of neural systems recruited
in decision-making over development [25–28]. Finally, studies
of economic outcomes show how variation in strategies can
have profound effects on people’s economic success, and con-
sequently, on macroeconomic dynamics [2,9,13]. For example,
more risk-averse individuals are less likely to engage in entre-
preneurial activities and invest in stocks, and countries with
higher aggregate risk aversion have lower productivity [9,13].
Yet this work also highlights how it can be difficult to
parse out the causes and consequences of different strategies,
because human economic behaviour is shaped by a complex
interplay of both biological influences that are shared with
other species, and cultural norms and institutions that are
unique to humans [29]. Since other animals must also make
assessments of value and cost–benefit trade-offs concerning
rewards like food or mates, but are not embedded in rich
cultural contexts like humans, comparative research can help
adjudicate different proposals for why humans show different
preferences across populations, individuals and contexts. This
approach can disentangle shared biological contributions
from cultural or human-specific features of decision-making,
aswell as provide a crucial line of insight into not just the econ-
omic consequences of different decision strategies (such as in
foraging contexts), but also the specific evolutionary contexts
that promote different kinds of strategies.
Here,we examine the evolutionary roots of human economic
behaviour byexamining shared core features of decision-making
under uncertainty across primates. While uncertainty broadly
encompasses both risk (or probabilistic variation in outcomes)
and ambiguity (or lack of knowledge of the associated probabil-
ities) [30], we primarily address risky choice, given that it has
been a greater focus of comparative research to date.We examine
primates as they are our closest evolutionary relatives, and
further exhibit several relevant parallels in their cognition and
neurobiology [31,32], social behaviour [33], sex differentiation
[34] and development [35,36]—yet also lack human-specific
formsof culture andeconomicmarkets.We first provideanover-
view of theoretical frameworks for decision-making under risk
from economics, psychology and biology. Then, we synthesize
empirical methods for measuring animal decision-making.
We then focus on variation in non-human primate choices
(i) across species and populations; (ii) across individuals accord-
ing topersonality traits, sex anddevelopmental stage; and finally
(iii) within individuals according to internal states and external
contexts. We use this empirical evidence to identify which fea-
tures of human decision-making are more widely shared with
other primates, versus which are novel and thus potentially cul-
turally malleable. Finally, we highlight new directions for future
waves of comparative research that can help us evaluate current
hypotheses for the origins of human economic behaviour.2. Modelling decision-making under risk
Predicting how humans and non-human animals make
decisions under risk is a major question in economics, psychol-
ogy and biology. Although classical economic theories suggest
that decision-makers should focus on the average expected
value provided by different options, people often exhibit a
strong aversion to risk [37,38]. For example, when presented
with choices between a certain option with a reliable outcome
(such as getting $10) and a risky option that can vary (such as a50% chance of winning $20), people overall prefer the certain
option—even though both provide the same average payoff
[38]. One model aiming to explain such examples of risk aver-
sion is the expected utility theory [38]. Here, rational actors
should prefer options that offer the highest subjective utility
(which may not align exactly with external markers of value),
weighted by the probability of obtaining that outcome [38].
While this is a straightforward and testable idea, it turns out
that people rarely conform to its predictions. Prospect theory,
therefore, aims to better capture this type of real-world behav-
iour, by distinguishing how people assign subjective value to
options fromhow they judge probabilities [37,38]. Here, prefer-
ences for options depend on whether they are perceived as
gains or losses [37]. Since people dislike negative changes in
the status quo (losses)more than they like an equivalent increase
(gain), this model accounts for several observed biases in
choice, such as framing effects where people are risk-seeking
for losses but risk-averse for gains [37].
By contrast to these approaches from economics, biologists
have developed models that share many of the same features
with a key difference: biologists assume decision-makers act to
maximize their biological fitness [39,40]. Thesemodels generally
formalize foraging decisions in which animals make choices
about different foods, and consider how different patterns of
food intake may affect fitness. A dominant model is risk
sensitivity theory, which highlights that the relationship between
calories and fitness outcomes is not one-to-one—paralleling
ideas from prospect theory about the nonlinear relationships
ofmoney and utility. Here, an animal’s optimal response to var-
iance in foraging payoffs depends on its resource budget [40,41]:
pursuing a predictable outcome may be advantageous for a
small animal in a positive energetic state (i.e. when there is a
concave relationship between the energy gain and fitness), but
risk-seeking is better for the same animal in a negative energetic
state (when there is a convex relationship) as this may be the
only pathway to survival [41]. This provides a biological expla-
nation of how reference points—here rooted in an animal’s
energetic state—may affect risky choice [42,43].
However, it is important to note that all of these approaches
struggle to account for some salient aspects of variation in
decision preferences seen in humans and animals. While both
economic and biological theories may address how context
[37,43], including the type of goods at stake [44], impacts indi-
viduals’ risk propensity, there is still no framework for
understanding the origin of inter-individual or population-
level differences in choice strategies—such as why there may
be stable risk-seeking phenotypes displayed by some individ-
uals but not others [32]. Similarly, humans and non-humans
sometimesbehaveaccording to thepredictionsof risk sensitivity
theory [41,45], yet this view is also not always successful at
predicting individuals’ risky choices [41]. For example, in
larger-bodied animals—where short-term energetic require-
ments do not represent a significant threat to survival—risk-
seeking behaviours may emerge more often when individuals
are in a positive energetic state [46]. Understanding the cause
of suchvariationacrosspopulationsandindividuals is, therefore,
a crucial step for building more predictive theoretical models.3. Measuring animal decision-making
Given that non-humans cannot talk, read or use money, a key
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evidence for variationrisk methodology
Figure 1. Empirical data on primate decision-making under risk. Phylogenetic distribution of current primate data across species indicating types of tasks, com-
parisons across species and individual variation between sexes and by age; and finally state and context manipulations; note that there is a lack of comparisons
across populations or by personality traits in studies of primate risk preferences. We report the references for studies in each category (see electronic supplementary





animal preferences. Human preferences can be measured in
experiments involving choices between different options,
often involving monetary rewards [47], or by looking at a
person’s ‘revealed preferences’ by observing their real-life
consumer behaviour [48]. Most animal studies, in contrast,
use a series of experiential foraging decisions about consum-
able rewards such as food to infer preferences [49]. Within
this general methodological approach, several different
kinds of tasks have been developed to probe primate
responses to risk (figure 1 and electronic supplementary
material). This variation in tasks is important for then inter-
preting different patterns of variation across studies using
different methodological approaches.
One common setup involves learned associationswhere ani-
mals are trained tounderstanddifferentpayoffs associatedwith
a ‘safe’ option yielding a constant food reward, and a ‘risky’
option yielding a reward that varies probabilistically around
the mean. For example, individuals might learn that a cue like
the colouror location of a container (or similar cues on acompu-
ter) signals different reward distributions. Animals can then
choose between two options, often involving the same average
payoff, to assess if they are sensitive to risk. For example, they
may choose between a safe option that always provides three
pieces of food, and a risky option that offers one or five pieces
with 50% likelihood. Thus, a preference for the safe option indi-
cates risk aversion, a preference for the risky option indicates
risk-seeking, and indifference indicates risk neutrality [49]. In
other cases, the payoff contingencies may be adjusted across
trials to test howanimalsmodulate their choiceswhen expected
values shift. Inmany studies, animals first gain experiencewith
rewardcontingencies ina learningphase to then examine stabil-
ized choice preferences in a test phase [50–57], whereas other
studies focus on how animals learn about the value and var-
iance of different outcomes [58,59]. This basic kind ofparadigm has been usedwithmultiple primate species, includ-
ing chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) [50,58,59], bonobos (Pan
paniscus) [50], gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) [59], rhesus macaques
(Macaca mulatta) [51–55], Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata)
[59], capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) [56,58] and several
lemur species (Lemur catta, Eulemur mongoz, Varecia rubra)
[57], in some cases with comparisons with humans [58,60].
A secondmethodology focuses on intuitive outcomes, exam-
ining how animals respond more spontaneously to different
situations that simulate risky outcomes without explicit train-
ing on cues signalling reward distributions. For example,
one reward may be hidden under one of several containers
out of the animal’s view, such that the number of possible con-
tainers indicates the probability that the reward is under any
particular cup. This risk option can then be contrasted with a
safe or known alternative to assess animals’ responses to risk
when both the amount of the reward and the probability of
obtaining it vary [61–66]. Another intuitive task involves
decisions about quality or type of food rewards [61–63]: an
intermediately preferred food type is placed in one container,
whereas either a high-value or low-value type of food (e.g. a
banana versus a cucumber) is hidden in another out of the ani-
mal’s view, to assess if it gambles on possibly receiving a
preferred food type. To date, this basic kind of paradigm has
been used to test chimpanzees [61–64], bonobos [61–64], oran-
gutans (Pongo abelii) [64], gorillas [64], mangabeys (Cercocebus
torquatus torquatus) [65] and capuchins [66], with comparisons
to humans [67].
A final approach uses exchange taskswhere animals learn to
exchange tokens or food with a human. For example, animals
may be initially provided with a food item, and then can
exchange it for the opportunity towin a larger, equal or smaller
food reward seen in one of several containers [68–70]. If the
animal chooses to exchange, the content of one container is
royalsocietypublishing.org
4randomly selected to simulate risk (similar to the intuitive tasks
described above). Other tasks involve the exchange of tokens
for food rewards to simulate a primate ‘market economy’
[71,72]. In particular, primates are given a budget of allotted
tokens they can distribute across experimenters with different
exchange rates. Exchange paradigms involving either token
or food trading have been used to test the four great apes
[69,70], Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) [68,70],
long-tailed macaques [68,69] and capuchins [68–72]./journal/rstb
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
376:201906714. Variation in animal decision strategies
Human risk propensity is characterized by wide variation at
both population and individual level, including differences
across cultures [1–5], genders [6,7], ages [9–13] and contexts
[14–19]. To understand this variation, we review empirical
studies of non-human primates’ preferences and discuss
how they inform the origins of human economic preferences.
(a) Variation across species
Human populations can exhibit differences in risk propensity,
so some proposals have highlighted that different strategies
may be favoured in different kinds of environments. For
example, some work highlights that experience with markets
may promote risk-seeking responses [3,5], whereas other
work argues that subsistence populations are actually relatively
risk-seeking [4]. More generally, this evidence shows how
human cultural groups may innovate different kinds of
decision-making strategies to navigate their local environment.
Comparisons of different animal species can provide a comp-
lementary test of these adaptive explanations. The
comparative method is a powerful tool for understating the
evolutionary history of different traits by comparing species
with different socioecological characteristics [73], so testing
different species on closely matched decision-making tasks
can assess how dietary ecology or social systems may promote
more risk-seeking versus risk-avoidant strategies.
Current evidence indicates that some primate species are
more risk-averse or more risk-seeking than others when
tested on matched tasks (figure 1 and electronic supple-
mentary material), even when sharing similar foundational
cognitive skills for understanding numerosity [74] and prob-
ability [75–77]. For example, bonobos are relatively more
risk-averse than chimpanzees in the same context [50,61–63].
Feeding ecology may ultimately explain this variation:
chimpanzees and bonobos are sister species, but show key
differences in their ecological niche. Whereas chimpanzees
exploit more seasonally variable and widely distributed fruit
resources and exhibit higher rates of risky hunting, bonobos
have more access to terrestrial herbaceous vegetation, an abun-
dant and reliable food source—differences in natural history
that predict a higher tolerance for risk in chimpanzees than
bonobos [78]. A comparison of all the four great ape species
aligns with this view: chimpanzees and orangutans were
both relatively risk-seeking, whereas bonobos and gorillas
were relatively risk-averse [64]. While orangutans feed on
highly seasonal fruits and engage in costly extractive foraging
behaviours,more like chimpanzees [79,80], gorillas rely on con-
sistent leaves and roots food resources and do not use tools in
the wild [81], more like bonobos.
Further evidence that natural history can shape decision-
making strategies comes from instances of evolutionaryconvergence, where distantly-related species that face similar
ecological problems evolve similar traits. For example, capu-
chin monkeys extensively use tools, hunt a variety of prey
(including some that can be dangerous) and feed on variable
food resources [80,82]—more like the socioecological features
seen in chimpanzees. Comparisons of capuchin and ape
decision-making in matched contexts found that capuchins
and chimpanzees are both more risk-seeking than their closer
relatives [82]. Indeed, this pattern of convergence may hold
across other aspects of decision-making, as chimpanzees and
capuchins monkeys also exhibit a greater preference for
larger, delayed rewards in inter-temporal choice tasks com-
pared with their closer relatives [82]. From an evolutionary
perspective, future rewards are generally inherently uncertain
[49], such that species that consume foods that entail long
delays (such as search times) while foraging in nature may
also need to tolerate the risk intrinsic to these situations.
Overall, these findings show thatmatched comparisons can
hone in on a biological ‘signature’ of species-specific cognitive
adaptations for decision-making, and identify the evolutionary
contexts that promote different strategies [78,82]. Variation in
animal decision-making strategies across populations provides
complementary evidence to studies of human populations
[3,5,12] finding that differences in population-level risk pro-
pensity can represent adaptive response to the challenge
posed by their natural environment. While that line of work
has often focused on how decision depends on culture or
market integration [3–5], comparative studies further identify
specific relevant characteristics of the ecologicalworld that pro-
mote different responses to risk: animals living in more
seasonally variable environments, and that feed on more tem-
porally and spatially heterogenous food resources, show a
greater preference for risk [78].(b) Variation across populations within a species
A related question iswhether primates exhibit population-level
differences as a result of experiences in theirown lifetime, rather
than of species-typical traits. This kind of experience-basedpro-
posal is an important explanation for human population-level
variation [5,20] that intersects with ideas about how culture
shapes risk propensity [3–5]. Importantly, comparisons of
different species living in similar environments, such as in
zoos or sanctuaries, often equate the experiences of different
species, thus minimizing the possibility that detected species
differences are a direct response to their experienced habitats
asmight be the case in thewild. Yet a growing bodyof evidence
also documents marked geographical variation within a given
species in some kinds of behaviours, such as tool use in wild
chimpanzees, orangutans and capuchins. This variation may
reflect social learning, but also may reflect individual pro-
blem-solving in response to local environmental challenges
such as food scarcity or availability of relevant materials [80].
This suggests there may also be population-level differences in
underlying decision-making preferences, given the important
role of such preferences in foraging behaviours.
To date, there have been no comparisons of whether pri-
mate populations differ in risk preferences. Some data do
suggest that divergent risk preferences between chimpanzees
and bonobos are detectable across different populations (e.g.
in zoos versus sanctuaries) tested with different method-
ologies [50,61–64], suggesting this is relatively stable




5populations. For example, capuchins from an Atlanta labora-
tory were markedly more patient in a delay of gratification
task than those from a Rome laboratory [83], raising the
possibility that differences in their experiences might shape
preferences. Along these lines, one relevant question is
whether primate populations that have been trained to use
tokens [71–72,84] exhibit different risk preferences from
those who have not. Such comparisons can test hypotheses
on the drivers of human economic preferences, since the
degree of market integration is proposed to influence
human populations [5,20]. Thus, within-species population
comparisons using the same methods are an important
issue for future work on animal decision-making.
(c) Trait differences across individuals
Human preferences also vary across individuals within the
same population: some individuals are more risk-seeking,
whereas others are consistently risk-averse. An individual’s
willingness to take risks can predict decisions about the
labour market, investments and even migration [13], so
personality and genetic factors that shape risk-seeking or
risk-averse profiles are an important focus of research. In
humans, some personality traits do appear to be related to
risk propensity [8,9,85,86]: sensation-seeking [85], impulsiv-
ity [86] and extraversion [8] are all associated with greater
risk-seeking, while conscientiousness [8] and neuroticism
[8] are associated with risk aversion. These propensities
may stem from heritable genetic variation, as monozygotic
twins show more similar responses to risk than do dizygotic
twins [22,23], and genetic variants in the serotoninergic and
dopaminergic neurotransmitter pathways predict individual
preferences [24]. This work, therefore, has highlighted the
specific psychological and neurobiological mechanisms that
shape risk responses across individuals.
Unfortunately, few studies have directly addressed
whether primates show comparable individual variation.
A key issue is that many relevant non-human populations
(where controlled experiments are possible) are fairly small.
However, some work does hint at shared neurobiological
mechanisms with humans: genetic variants in the dopamine
transporter predicted individual differences in inter-temporal
choice in capuchins [87], and reducing serotonin levels via
tryptophan depletion increased risk preference in rhesusmaca-
ques [53]. A crucial next step will then be characterizing
individual variation in risk propensity in larger samples. For
example, a study of 37 chimpanzees and bonobos [63] compar-
ing these species also found a fair amount of inter-individual
variation in risk propensity, as individual bonobos chose the
risky option in between 6 and 67% of trials, and chimpanzees
between 11 and 100%. Other studies have successfully tested
larger samples of a single species on decision-making tasks
[88]. By relating this kind of variation in risk propensity to indi-
viduals’ specific personality traits or genetics, itwill be possible
to assess the degree towhich humans and other primates share
these mechanisms for risky choice.
(d) Sex differences
Humans also exhibit variation in risky decision-making by
gender: women are less willing to take risks than men across
several contexts [6,7]. This has implications for real-world
economic behaviour, as women are less likely to work under
variable-payment schemes in the labour market and makesafer investments [7–9]. Some proposals ascribe this difference
to cultural learning about gender roles [6], whereas other
explanations emphasize that neurobiological differences in
brain regions associated with decision-making [27,28] or vari-
ation in hormones like testosterone [19] can also drive gender
differences. Since other primates lack human-like gender
socialization, but exhibit strong parallels in terms of sexual
differentiation in the brain and body [36], they can help
distinguish between these mechanistic explanations.
Primates do show several well-characterized sex differences
in behaviour that reflect females’ andmales’ optimal behaviour-
al strategies—and are plausibly related to risk attitudes. For
example, female chimpanzees tend to be less gregarious and
engage in more extractive foraging than males, reflecting the
greater impact of food competition on female reproductive
success, whereas male chimpanzees engage in more risky
aggression and hunting than females [89,90]. Along the same
lines, male capuchins spend more time on the ground foraging
for exposed large invertebrates and small vertebrates, whereas
females remain a few metres above the ground searching for
embedded invertebrates [91]. More generally, females may be
more sensitive to maintaining a consistent energetic state
owing to the costs of pregnancy and lactation [34]. This line of
reasoning suggests that males would exhibit a greater tolerance
for economic risk than females.
Yet several studies have compared risk preferences across
male and female primates, and consistently failed to find any
appreciable sex differences (figure 1 and electronic supplemen-
tary material). This includes studies of chimpanzees [50,63],
bonobos [50], capuchins [56,66] and mangabeys [65]. While
this may be in part due to small sample sizes, other studies
did detect sex differences in decision-making in comparable
samples. For example, a study of 40 apes found that males
were more susceptible to a framing manipulation than females
[92]. Similarly, a study of 16 capuchins found that females
could delay gratification more than males [93]. Thus, current
evidence suggests that there may be at best subtle sex differ-
ences in psychological risk propensity in primates, despite
stark differences in some forms of behavioural risk-taking.
This accords with a broader set of findings indicating that pri-
mates only sometimes exhibit sex differences in cognition
paralleling those in humans [33,94,95]. Overall, this evidence
suggests that gender differences in risky choice observed in
humans may be primarily due to socialization experiences,
not to biological differences that are shared with other species,
given the weak or absent evidence for parallel effects in
non-human primates.(e) Developmental change over the life-course
Human risk preferences can also change over the lifespan:
adolescents tend to be more risk-prone than either children
or adults [25,26], and older adults show a mixed pattern of
increasing risk aversion or preservation of risk attitudes
depending on task demands [9–13]. These developmental
shifts in risk preference have important macroeconomic
consequences: aging societies invest less in risky stocks and
entrepreneurial activities, and show higher support for conser-
vative savings and investment strategies that impact societal
productivity [9,13]. Several proposals argue that age-related
changes in the neural circuits underlying decision-making
drive these shifts both during maturation in adolescence




6as differences in educational attainment or experience of his-
torical events like the Great Depression, may also underlie
some apparent age differences [97,98].
Other primates also exhibit relatively slow life histories like
humans [99], and studies of comparative cognitive develop-
ment indicate that animals can exhibit developmental
change in spatial memory [100] and gaze-following [33] that
mirror those in humans. However, most studies of primate
risk preferences to date have not found major age-related
changes (figure 1 and electronic supplementary material).
This is the case for chimpanzees [50,63], bonobos [50,63], man-
gabeys [65] and capuchins [56,66]. As with sex differences, it is
important to note that this work has generally involved small
sample sizes with limited age ranges, so a crucial step is to
examine populations with greater age variation. Moreover,
given that adolescence and old age are points in the life-
course that show major shifts in humans, these periods war-
rant special attention in non-humans. For example, a study
examining probability inference in 80 rhesusmonkeys ranging
from juvenility to old age found that all age groups distin-
guished statistically unlikely from statistically likely
outcomes [77], suggesting that older macaques do not show
the same declines in probabilistic inference seen in older
humans [96]. Thus, current work suggests that non-humans
may not show all the same age-related changes seen in
humans, but is also fairly limited in scope.( f ) State-dependent choice
Individuals can show different responses to risk across situ-
ations: the same person’s choices may depend on their
internal energetic state, transitory fluctuations in hormones
or their emotional state at the moment of the decision. For
example, peoplemay change their responses to risk depending
on whether they are hungry [45]. Differences in levels of hor-
mones like testosterone and cortisol can also impact risk
propensity:whereas increasing cortisol drives greater risk aver-
sion [18] testosterone increases risk-seeking [19]. Finally, even
transient emotional states affect risk propensity: while more
positive emotions can increase risk-taking, negative states,
such as sadness, decrease people’s preference for risk [16,17].
Recent work suggests that some of these processes are
sharedbetweenhumansandotherprimates.First, chimpanzees,
bonobos and capuchins show several features of human-like
emotional responses to risky decision-making [63,101] (figure 1
and electronic supplementary material). In particular, they
showed more indicators of negative emotional states—such as
negative vocalizations, scratching or throwing a tantrum—
when theygambledand lost comparedwithwhen theygambled
andwonorplayed it safe. In addition, apes and capuchins spon-
taneously attempted to ‘switch’ their initial choices after
gambling and losing—that is, they attempted to revise their
choice and select the forgone option, a behaviour they rarely
showed in response to other outcomes. In this way, choice
switching might be a behavioural indicator of ‘regret’ [16].
By contrast, studies examining the influence of the
hormonal state on primate economic decision-making are
scant, which is surprising given the evidence that cortisol
and testosterone shape many aspects of primate behaviour
[102]. Direct manipulations of primates’ internal states to test
causal relationships are also lacking, which is also surprising
given the great theoretical attention devoted to the impact of
energy budget on risk propensity [41]. To date, only onestudy has conducted an energy manipulation in primates,
and it found that rhesus macaques become more risk-seeking
when their energy level is higher [55]—paralleling wild
observations that larger-bodied primates engage in more
risk-prone hunting in times of resource plenty, the opposite
of the pattern seen in small animals [46]. Overall then, while
there have not been many investigations into the impact of
the internal state on primate risk choice, current data do
suggest some psychological or physiological mechanisms
potentially shared with humans.(g) Context-dependent variation
Decision preferences can also be affected by external factors.
Several aspects of context can shape human choice, including
the specific currency of the reward at stake [67,103] and the
larger social context. Importantly, these processes intersect
with the state-dependent effects described in the prior section:
social context or reward currency may affect risk propensity by
impacting internal emotional or hormonal states. That is,
differences in internal states may in fact stem from cues in
the external environmental context.
Here, we focus primarily on social context, as this is a cru-
cial evolutionarily relevant context. In particular, humans
exhibit both extensive and flexible cooperation compared
with other primates [104], and this dependence on social
exchange strategies may have shaped our responses to risk.
In fact, people do tend to be more risk-seeking when other
people are present than when alone [14] or in competitive con-
texts [15]. This may in part reflect a fundamental distinction
concerning how humans respond to social versus non-social
risk: people are less willing to gamble on the trustworthiness
of another person compared with an identical non-social risk,
a phenomenon called betrayal aversion [105]. This increased
sensitivity to social risks may arise from uniquely human
emotions and motivations used in cooperative contexts, such
as reciprocity or theory of mind skills [106]. Indeed, hunter–
gatherers, who are an important model of how humans have
lived for most of our species’ existence, appear to buffer the
high risks associatedwith a diet focused on high-value but dif-
ficult to obtain foods by engaging in extensive food sharing
[107]. Thus, studies of non-human primates can help disentan-
gle how human-specific patterns of decision-making facilitate
human cooperative economic behaviours like exchange, trade
and investment.
While other primates do not engage in exchange or food
sharing to the extent that humans do, they are also highly
social and must constantly make decisions about whether to
cooperate or compete with others. These situations inherently
pose problems involving risk because decision-makers must
choose between courses of action where another individual’s
behaviour creates variability in payoffs. Accordingly, there is
some evidence that social context may impact non-human risk
choices too (figure 1 and electronic supplementary material).
For example, both chimpanzees and bonobos are more risk-
seeking following a competitive interaction, compared with a
neutral or a playful one [62]. Conversely, capuchins become
more risk-averse in the presence of a conspecific than when
alone [108]. Finally, chimpanzees were more averse to uncer-
tainty stemming from another individual who can choose to
reciprocate, versus a non-social probabilistic device [109].
More generally, several studies have adapted human econ-
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Figure 2. The origins of human variation in human economic behaviour. Comparative studies of other primates can help disentangle the relative role of shared
biological processes versus human-unique cultural influences in risk preferences. Current evidence for variation across populations, individuals and contexts in





game [110], the stag-hunt game [111] and the trust game
[112,113]. In the modified trust game, chimpanzees could
choose between obtaining a small but safe reward, or sending
a larger reward to a partner who could then either reciprocate
and send back a higher value reward or not. Chimpanzees will
accept the social risk associated with trusting their partner
[112]—especially when the partner is a close friend [113].
This suggests that a basic sensitivity towards degrees of
social uncertainty may be shared with other primates. Yet a
key question is, therefore, whether humans have special abil-
ities to monitor social risk to thereby protect against free
riders, given the greater scope of cooperation and reciprocity
seen in humans [104,114] and the importance of social risk-
taking in human economic systems [115]. For example, other
primates may not be as proficient at dealing with risk imposed
by exchanges because they cannot make formal agreements or
enforce reciprocation. This highlights how both novel cognitive
capacities (for engaging in cooperation) as well as human-
specific cultural norms for these interactions may re-shape
human social risk preferences compared with other species.5. Conclusion: primate decision-making and
human economic origins
Humans exhibit great variation in responses to risk across
populations, individuals and contexts, so understanding the
origins of this variation is crucial to explaining patterns
of human economic behaviour. We have argued that com-
parative studies of decision-making can disentangle the
mechanisms and the function of this variation to address
questions about both the proximate mechanisms and the
ultimate consequences of these decision-making patterns.
As such, non-human primates provide a complementary
line of evidence to test hypotheses about the origins of
human economic behaviours (figure 2).We found that non-humans sometimes show patterns of
variation like those in humans. For example, emotional
states, social context and some neurotransmitter systems
can modulate risk preferences in primates like in humans.
This suggests that at least some of the proximate psychologi-
cal mechanisms driving human economic behaviour build
upon cognitive, emotional and neurobiological substrates
that are shared with other primates Yet other mechanisms
may be more specific to humans: while humans show
robust gender differences in risk preferences as well as devel-
opmental change over the life-course, there is limited
evidence for parallel shifts in non-human risky choice. This
suggests that this variation may stem more from human-
specific mechanisms, such as cultural learning and socializa-
tion. Given that culturally based traits are more malleable
and thus more amenable to interventions, this provides
new clues for promoting optimal economic behaviour in
humans.
A second question concerns the ultimate consequences of
variation in risk preferences. Here, comparative work can pro-
vide an important line of evidence to test the adaptive
consequences of different strategies. For example, there are
robust species differences in responses to risk indicating that
species that typically feed on more variable, heterogeneous
resources are relatively more risk-seeking. Yet there are also
crucial differences in human and animal patterns that may
stem from humans’ novel socioecological niche. Human
hunter–gatherer lifestyles are characterized by a dependence
on high-value and high-risk foods that may have required
new social mechanisms to cope with a greater variability in
foraging, such as food sharing and resource redistribution
[107,116]. As a consequence, humans might have evolved
new cognitive abilities and innovated new cultural practices
to deal with the social risks presented by exchanges.
Yet there is still much work to be done. First, different
species and questions have sometimes been tested using differ-
ent tasks (figure 1), limiting some inferences across studies. In
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
Ph
8addition, primate studies, in general, are often limited by small
sample sizes, especially with respect to questions of intra-
individual variation. As such, comparisons of decision-
making using standardized methods in larger populations
with wider variation in sex, ages or particular life experiences
are crucial to test these ideas. Finally, the animal choice typi-
cally involves biologically relevant rewards, but there is
increasing evidence that people can be more risk-seeking
when making ‘foraging’ decisions about food than in equival-
ent decisions involving money [67,103]. Given that humans
engage in evolutionarily novel forms of economic exchange
involving abstract currencies, but other primates can be trained
to use and exchange tokens in specific contexts [84], animals
thus present untapped opportunities to test how experiencewith markets impacts economic decision-making. More gener-
ally, comparative research is well-positioned to advance our
understanding of human economic behaviour by pinpointing
the necessary cognitive and experiential prerequisites that
enable different aspects of decision-making and exchange.
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